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Chapter 8
Intangible and Tangible
Retirement Incentives
John Keefe

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

A large number of colleges and universities have designed programs that
provide incentives for faculty to retire earlier than they might otherwise
choose. Other chapters in this volume oﬀer surveys and case studies of retirement plan features and behavior, including how they were developed as
well as statistics on faculty acceptance. This chapter takes a diﬀerent tack
by examining the early retirement decision primarily from the employee’s
perspective—that is, how an individual might weigh the choice between fulltime professorship and part-time work or full retirement. We ﬁnd that in
designing retirement incentive programs, administrators and faculty should
place an equal emphasis on how the intangible aspects of retirement will
compare to the accomplishment and collegiality of teaching life. The importance of these intangibles varies from person to person and will likely be
diﬀerent from institution to institution. Nonmonetary factors are diﬃcult to
sort out, and may require more ﬂexible oﬀerings than administrators are accustomed to making. Nevertheless, the lifestyle and self-esteem factors are
often as important to a plan’s success as are the cash incentives.
The process of identifying the relevant nonmonetary variables, and then
measuring the value or level of utility they provide to diﬀerent individuals,
is problematic. Consider, for instance, diﬀerences in lifestyle preferences
and other factors expressed in national retirement statistics. Americans are
retiring, on average, at younger and younger ages. As Dora Costa points
out in her important work on the history of retirement, people no doubt
have monetary justiﬁcations for retiring sooner, but, monetary factors being
equal, nonmonetary factors help explain why some people retire sooner
than others (Costa 1998).
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The Decision of the Early Retiree
One approach is to think about how a faculty member might evaluate his or
her own well being. Typical early retirement oﬀers result in a mix of factors
that are both monetary (such as the value of a lump sum incentive payment
for early retirement, part-time salary, or ongoing health insurance) and nonmonetary (such as the rewards of pursuing hobbies or travel earlier than
would otherwise be the case). The retiree’s challenge is to weigh the prospective value of the mix of the new options against the expected value of
full-time employment.
Predicting how an employee will react to an early retirement oﬀer is complicated. Individuals have diﬀerent economic situations, lifestyle preferences, and views of the future. To an individual who has saved enough to
fund a comfortable retirement, the monetary options of early retirement—
or even a continuing salary from full-time employment—may have less inﬂuence on the retirement decision than the nonmonetary options. For a
person for whom working is a hardship, due perhaps to illness, the nonmonetary value of continuing to work full time may be relatively small, or
even negative. On the other hand, a person who has few interests outside
academia, or who has particularly strong attachments to the university, may
place a relatively low value on the nonmonetary aspects of retired life.
Not only will the estimate of the future value of an early retirement choice
vary across individuals, but also a given individual’s view of the decision to
retire early may change over time. Between the ages of 60 and 70, the relative
importance of salary, collegiality, and career achievement can vary substantially. Moreover, there is great uncertainty surrounding the retirement decision. Most people can only guess at how well they will adapt to leaving their
institutions, whether they will enjoy the sudden abundance of free time, and
what standard of living their retirement income will provide over the long
run.
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A Complete Example: Incentive Payment
To consider a hypothetical example, assume that a professor age 62 years
and who has planned to retire at 65, is oﬀered a lump sum cash incentive to
retire early. How can she determine her ‘‘best’’ alternative?
By simplifying what is almost always a complex personal decision, we can
examine the question in a more rigorous way. The pertinent period of time
is only the three years subject to early retirement; our professor had planned
to retire at 65 anyway. Therefore, during the prospective early retirement
years of 62 to 64, how can the professor estimate the future value of continuing to work, versus taking the early retirement package?
Her ﬁrst option is staying in her job full time for three more years, earn-
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Table 1. Retirement Versus Continued Work
Full-time work

Retirement

Primary income

Salary
Saving for retirement

Lump-sum payment

Secondary income

Consulting

Consulting

Work life

Teaching and research

Postuniversity study

Nonwork life

‘‘Being a professor at the
university’’
Community
Prestige

Time with spouse and family
Travel, hobbies, etc.
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Source: See text.

ing the monetary value of salary and retirement contributions from the university, plus any consulting or other nonteaching income, and enjoying the
personal satisfaction of teaching, research, and service to the faculty and
students. Her alternative is to accept the university’s early retirement oﬀer
and retire immediately. In so doing she would collect the lump sum retirement incentive and gain the nonmonetary value of increased leisure time.
However, she would forgo the salary to be earned until 65, and her pension account would be smaller, having missed three years of contributions
(a possible indirect eﬀect is that consulting and other outside income might
drop oﬀ if she were no longer aﬃliated with her institution). She would also
give up the nonmoney beneﬁts of teaching and research. Table 1 details the
monetary and nonmonetary options of this example.
A little more background is needed to evaluate such a decision. First, we
have to know the standing of the professor’s retirement account, to determine whether retirement is even a realistic choice. Can she retire at 62—
living on the lump sum plus savings until 65—and then have an adequate
income for the rest of her life? If not, her decision is straightforward. She
needs to keep working until 65, and perhaps beyond.
Let’s assume that the professor does have suﬃcient savings and retirement
funds. The relative values of factors she has to trade oﬀ are her salary versus the lump sum, and the value of work versus retirement. To express the
point more formally, we can hypothesize that the professor will accept early
retirement when the total estimated future value from early retirement in
the years 62 through 64 is greater than the value of being a full-time professor. We then decide by comparing the monetary and nonmonetary aspects
of working and retirement, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3.
During the years of age 62 to 64, the professor would receive after-tax
payments worth $180,000 were she to continue working, and $75,000 were
she to accept the early retirement oﬀer. The nonmonetary value of working
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Table 2. Value of Working Until 65
Monetary assumptions:
Three years salary
Three years of institution’s retirement contributions
Total monetary value

$250,000 before taxes
$150,000 after taxes
$ 30,000 after taxes
$180,000 after taxes

Nonmonetary assumptions: value of teaching, scholarship,
service = 3W
Source: See text.
W = nonmonetary value of working.

Table 3. Value of Early Retirement, 62–64
Monetary assumptions:
Early retirement lump sum
Medical insurance
Total monetary value

$80,000 before taxes
$50,000 after taxes
$25,000 after taxes
$75,000 after taxes

Nonmonetary Assumptions:
Value of retirement activities = 3R
Uncertainty of beneﬁts of retirement = e

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Source: See text.
R = nonmonetary value of retiring.

for one year is represented by W, and the nonmonetary value of retiring is
represented by R.
In addition to creating variables to represent the nonmonetary values of
work and retirement, we have introduced an uncertainty factor, e, to represent the uncertainty of the beneﬁts of retirement. Although this uncertainty
cannot be quantiﬁed and varies from person to person, it is important to
recognize. Retirement is a decision a person makes only once, and the cost
of a bad choice is very high. The value of e is negative in many cases, but
because it is not quantiﬁable, we have assigned it a zero value and left the
variable in the expressions simply as a reminder of its importance.
Two additional monetary variables might be considered in the case of
early retirement. First, our professor might be able start drawing social security payments at age 62, and thus receive an additional monetary beneﬁt for
retirement in the years 62 through 64. We have ignored this income for the
sake of simplicity, but we note that in many cases it might be an important
cash ﬂow to the early retiree, and thus tilt the analysis in favor of selecting
early retirement. Second, we have ignored the value of a retirement account
or other savings on which she might draw before age 65. In drawing down
a retirement account she would be better oﬀ by the amount of the income,
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but worse oﬀ by the amount of the reduced savings, so again for simplicity
we omit this from the analysis.
Should our professor accept the oﬀer? The arithmetic says that she should
retire early if
3R + $75,000 + e > 3W + $180,000.

That is, the prospective retiree should accept this oﬀer if the intangible
value of being retired for three years, 3R, discounted for uncertainty, e, is
worth $105,000 or more than the intangible value of continuing to work
for three years. Looking at the expression in terms of one year gives this
relationship:
Intangibles of Retirement = Intangibles of Work + $35,000.

Thus the structure of this oﬀer puts a very high implicit cash value on
retiring. Our example professor should accept only under unusual circumstances. One case is where the value of retirement is especially high to her,
for instance, if an attractive job oﬀer has happened to come along at the
same time as the early retirement oﬀer. Similarly, she should accept if, for
some reason, the value of hobbies or travel in those three years is especially
high (in most cases, however, she would be able to hike the Appalachians or
collect snails at age 65, and come out ahead ﬁnancially through continuing
to work). Another case where she should accept the early retirement oﬀer is
where the value of work is especially low, or even negative. This oﬀer might
prevail where the professor or her spouse is suﬀering an illness, or where
the professor has completely lost her taste for teaching.
The arithmetic tells us that to make the oﬀer of early retirement as attractive as continuing to work, the school’s lump sum payment has to make
up for (1) the lost salary and pension contribution in years 62 to 64; (2) the
diﬀerence, if any, between the intangibles of work and the intangibles of retirement; and (3) the uncertainty of retiring three years early. (A professor
who thinks in plain English might express the oﬀer this way: ‘‘They are asking me to give up the work I like and have done well for thirty years, and to
start a retirement I am not sure I am ready for. Maybe I’m better oﬀ working
for the three years and earning the extra $100,000.’’)

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Adding a Phased Retirement Option
We now examine the decision to accept or reject a ‘‘phased retirement’’ oﬀer.
Instead of the lump sum incentive oﬀer, let’s assume the same professor receives an oﬀer where she would work half-time for the years 62 to 64 and
receive 50 percent of her salary. Pension contributions would be made on
the reduced salary, and she would retain health beneﬁts at the same cost as
under full-time employment.
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Table 4. Phased Retirement Until 65
Monetary assumptions:
Three years salary
Three years retirement contributions
Total monetary value of phased retirement

$125,000 before taxes
$ 75,000 after taxes
$ 15,000 after taxes
$ 90,000

Nonmonetary assumptions:
Value of teaching, scholarship and service
Value of retirement activities
Uncertainty of retiring

= (3 × 0.5W ) = 1.5W
= (3 × 0.5R) = 1.5R
= 0.5 × e

Source: See text.
R = nonmonetary value of retiring.
W = nonmonetary value of working.

In this case, our professor is enjoying a portion of the nonmonetary beneﬁts of both working and retired life, and she faces only part of the uncertainty of retirement. (For the moment we have assumed that each factor is
reduced by half, but we will demonstrate later that the proportions of work,
salary and retirement are crucial to the analysis). Table 4 summarizes the
assumptions.
Under these assumptions the decision-making expression becomes:
1.5W + 1.5R + $90,000 + (0.5 × e) > 3W + $180,000.

That is, if the sum of the nonmonetary attributes of a half-working and halfretired life, plus the $90,000 to be received from working part time, are
greater than the value of working plus salary, then our professor should accept phased retirement. Working through the arithmetic gives this result in
terms of one year’s worth of retirement:

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

intangibles of retirement = intangibles of work + $60,000.

Assuming these proportions, this oﬀer is less attractive than the previous
lump sum example by the amount of the incentive payment. That is, to a
person who accepts this oﬀer, the implicit cash value of retiring is $60,000
over the value of working. However, if the assumptions are altered so that
(1) the arrangement calls for 50 percent of full-time pay for 33 percent of
full-time teaching, and that (2) the balance between the intangible beneﬁts is changed—so that we assume that our professor manages to give up
less of the value of work and get more beneﬁt from retirement—the decision
equation becomes:
2W + 2R + $120,000 + (0.5 × E) > 3W + $180,000.
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In terms of one year, this expression becomes:
intangibles of retirement > 0.5(intangibles of work) + 30,000.

Under the assumption that the phased retiree can keep more of the beneﬁts of work (perhaps due to participation in a special senior faculty advisor
program, or other measures that place an emphasis on the contributions
of retiring professors) and at the same time add more of the beneﬁts of retirement (due to a lighter teaching load), the option of early retirement becomes more attractive. Accepting early retirement is twice as valuable in the
second phased example as in the ﬁrst, and more than twice as valuable as
the incentive payment example.

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Prospective Retiree ‘‘Types’’
We can categorize the decisionmakers according to their preferences—
grouping them into ‘‘types’’—and thus account for the consequent range of
decisions (Harsanyi 1967,1968). Four diﬀerent types within the population
of prospective academic retirees may be identiﬁed, according to individuals’
utility for the nonmonetary aspects of work life and retired life. Prospective
retirees who assign a high value (or low value) to teaching, research, school
service and collegiality are ranked ‘‘high W ’’ (or ‘‘low W ’’). Prospects who
place a high value (or low value) on travel, hobbies or time spent with family
are ranked ‘‘high R’’ (or ‘‘low R’’). Other determinants of a potential retiree’s
R status, as noted earlier, would be his or her employment options outside
the university, or a personal or spouse health limitation that would make
working full-time less attractive.
Table 5 lays out the four types in this analysis. A person who is satisﬁed
with working full time and has little interest in travel or hobbies—at least
during the years 62 to 64, the time subject to consideration for early retirement—would be ranked ‘‘high W, low R.’’ A professor with both a high level
of current job satisfaction and excellent work prospects outside the university would be ranked ‘‘high W, high R.’’ As mentioned earlier, the shifting of
a person’s preferences over time could mean that an individual’s type could
change as well.
In general, prospective retirees with low W values would probably be attracted to incentive payment plans, as they are giving up little job satisfaction. Those with high W values, on the other hand, would likely want to keep
a hand in teaching or research, and might thus be more attracted to oﬀers involving part-time teaching assignments. People with high R values are more
likely to accept early retirement oﬀers than those with low values.
Two analyses examining the early retirement oﬀerings made to professors
in the University of California (UC) system have used a similar typology:

6140 Clark / TO RETIRE OR NOT / sheet 143 of 186

Intangible and Tangible Retirement Incentives

135

Table 5. ‘‘Types’’ of Faculty by Nonmonetary Values

Low R
High R

Low W

High W

Low value to working
Low value to retirement
Low value to working
High value to working

High value to working
Low value to retirement
High value to retirement
High value to retirement

Source: See text.
W = the nonmonetary value of working.

Switkes (this volume) and Pencavel (1997). From personnel dossiers of faculty eligible for three waves of early retirement incentive oﬀers, Pencavel
developed proﬁles on those likely to participate in UC’s early retirement
programs. He found that individuals who accepted the oﬀers tended to be
older and earned lower salaries. Both Pencavel and Switkes indicate that the
UC plans hit their mark, by encouraging retirement by less productive faculty while not causing the more productive faculty to leave. In particular,
in one wave of oﬀers, only 6 percent of faculty in their late 50s accepted,
versus nearly 60 percent of those in their late 60s. They also found that individuals turning down early retirement oﬀers tended to earn much higher
salaries than those who accepted, suggesting that the more accomplished
and active scholars (the high W group) stayed while their less productive
colleagues (the low W group) chose to retire. Last, faculty rejecting the early
retirement incentives were entitled to pensions averaging only 62 percent
of ﬁnal salary, while those accepting were slated for a replacement rate of
75 percent. A higher replacement rate would reduce some of the ﬁnancial
uncertainty surrounding retirement (the e term in the expressions above).
When an institution is designing an early retirement plan, identifying
types among the targeted faculty is crucial. Once the needs and preferences
of the targets are understood, administrators can then create incentives that
will encourage the redundant professors to leave or cut back, while reducing
the risk of adverse selection (that is, losing key senior faculty as a result of
oﬀering the wrong incentives).

What Does All This Mean?
Our analysis suggests three conclusions that may be useful to administrators
in the real world:

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

•

The size of incentive payments is not the most important variable in an
early retirement decision.
• The most important variables are the prospective retiree’s intangible re-
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wards from work and retirement. In most circumstances, these factors
are not under the administrator’s control.
Early retirement is not an eﬀective form of performance management.

Money by itself—at least, in amounts aﬀordable to most institutions—will
likely have little impact on the early retirement decision. If a tenured professor is unwilling to retire because he needs the money, then an institution
probably will have to pay the professor at least as much as his salary to leave.
If he has already provided for retirement, but cannot imagine a life without
teaching, the institution will be at a disadvantage in encouraging his retirement if its only tool is a payment incentive.
While it is diﬃcult to place dollar values on the intangibles of work, it
is clear from the low acceptance rates of most programs that faculty value
these as highly as cash. Thus if an institution can meaningfully enhance
the status of retired professors, design an appealing part-time program, or
otherwise make retirement into a ‘‘win–win’’ situation for both the professor
and the institution, a greater acceptance rate may result.
Some institutions have undertaken unconventional strategies to encourage early retirement, with the goal of reducing the nonmonetary value
of professorship, including enforcing tenure review, appropriating oﬃce
space, and otherwise making life diﬃcult for prospective retiree. We would
not recommend these approaches, however, as they are harsh for the employee and may send undesired signals to the next generation of senior faculty. Another option—one requiring a long-term view on the university’s
part—would be to carefully study professor demographics, share the information and the university’s goals with the faculty, and encourage them to
contemplate retirement or part-time teaching well before any bottlenecks
occur. With a better understanding of the university’s reasons for the early
retirement transaction, and a clearer vision of the retired life ﬁve or ten years
in advance, academics would suﬀer less uncertainty and might possibly welcome early retirement oﬀers.
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Conclusion
In designing a retirement plan, administrators must place an equal emphasis
on how the intangible aspects of retirement will compare to the attractions
of teaching life. In developing retirement oﬀers, administrators should take
into account what factors will appeal to diﬀerent groups, or ‘‘types,’’ within
the population of prospective retirees. Nonmonetary factors are diﬃcult to
sort out, and may require more ﬂexible oﬀerings than administrators are
accustomed to making, but the lifestyle and self-esteem factors are as important to a plan’s success as the cash incentives.
By their nature, however, these techniques have limitations, and they
must be developed and applied carefully. It is diﬃcult for administrators to
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assess an objective value for the nonmonetary factors embedded in an oﬀer,
or predict how employees will react to them. Nonetheless, the intangibles
are an important part of each person’s retirement decision, and should be
considered alongside retirement income and incentive payments.
Dr. Yaw Nyarko of New York University contributed to the game theory
analysis in this essay.
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